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Abstract—Systems of systems (SoSs) are vulnerable to faults,
for example arising as a result of the distribution and inde-
pendence of their constituent systems. Our previous work has
presented an initial framework for reasoning about faults and
fault-tolerant design within an SoS at the architectural level, using
a simple example of a single failure. In this paper we present a
motivating example of an SoS within which failures of constituent
systems (CSs) may lead to a degraded or partial service for the
SoS. We discuss a possible extension to our earlier framework to
allow an architectural engineer to reason about the fault tolerance
of an SoS where CSs contribute negatively or positively towards
a goal or an SoS-level failure, and where multiple SoS faults may
interact to affect SoS service quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a system of systems (SoS), the components of the
overall system are themselves independent systems. An SoS is
typically large, complex, distributed, and operating in a domain
with high requirements for safety, reliability and accuracy. As
such, there are particular demands on the SoS engineer to
consider fault tolerance carefully. For example, connectivity
problems are a risk and the constituent systems (CSs) may
withdraw from the SoS arbitrarily. Independently-owned CSs
may evolve without taking into account the needs of the
SoS, or providing advance warning. CSs may also baulk at
the need to implement possibly costly recovery processes for
faults introduced by third parties. For these reasons, we believe
that there is a need for quality tools and methods to support
reasoning about the SoS at the architectural level. The COM-
PASS1 project has developed a Fault Modelling Architectural
Framework (FMAF) that provides a systematic approach to
capturing fault tolerance aspects of SoSs, described in previous
publications [1], [2], [3].
In this paper we present a new case study that presents a
different approach to failure, in that a ‘failure’ is interpreted
as an increasingly degraded level of service to which faults
contribute. Using this as a motivating example, the contribution
of this paper is to demonstrate how to apply the COMPASS
FMAF to support reasoning about degraded level of SoS
service and the representation of failures as events or as states.
We suggest some extensions to the FMAF to accomplish this.
Following our earlier examples, we use SysML [4] to present
our models.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: Section II
summarises some previous work on architectural approaches
1http://www.compass-research.eu/
to fault modelling and Section III briefly introduces the Fault
Modelling Architectural Framework we use. Section IV intro-
duces our case study. We describe here how we incorporate
notions of degraded service into the FMAF using some exten-
sions to the FMAF. Finally Section V presents our discussion
and conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Fault-tolerant architectures have been widely studied in
the literature (e.g., see [5]). Architectural approaches are
particularly useful for modelling fault tolerance within an SoS
at an early stage – for example, for identifying CSs that
may be responsible for introducing, detecting and recovering
from various faults (the independence of the CSs can be a
problem for ensuring a fault-tolerant service is delivered, when
functionality is composed from interactions between CSs).
Architectural approaches have been demonstrated previously
in related fields, such as modelling of erroneous behaviour in
embedded systems [6], [7], analysis of dependable complex
physical systems [8] and verification of safety requirements
in safety-critical embedded control systems [9]. Other work
explores architectural approaches for modeling non-functional
requirements (e.g., an extension to SysML to allow goals to
be refined into sub-goals [10]).
We rely on an existing dependability taxonomy [11], but
we make some slight adaptations to suit an SoS context. We
define a failure as a deviation of the service provided by an
SoS from the expected (correct) behaviour. An error is defined
as the SoS state that can lead to its subsequent service failure.
The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a
fault. Point of view is important for SoS modelling; a failure
from the point of view of a single CS becomes a fault from
the point of view of the SoS.
III. FAULT MODELLING ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORK
The Fault Modelling Architectural Framework (FMAF) has
been developed by the COMPASS project to provide a system-
atic approach to capturing fault tolerance and dependability
aspects of SoSs. Initial work on the FMAF has been described
previously [1], [2]. The FMAF particularly provides support
for: definition of faults, errors and failures; the identification of
the causal chains of dependability threats, of the CSs and their
interfaces, and of erroneous behaviour/recovery processes;
behaviour description of processes in the presence of faults
and recovery process. The FMAF incorporates a total of eight
different viewpoints, used to explore and present faults and
fault-tolerant concepts within an SoS. We present only a short
selection of viewpoints here; a complete list can be found
in [1], [2], [3].
IV. CASE STUDY
Our case study is supplied by West Consulting, and is
extracted from a Traffic Management System (TMS) that
controls the inter-urban road network in the Netherlands. The
TMS collects information about current conditions and traffic
flow and takes actions to achieve some predefined global goals
regarding traffic behaviour. The goals of a TMS are complex
and include: improving efficiency of the road network; ensur-
ing road safety; reducing the negative impact of problems such
as accidents and blockages; and reducing environmental impact
(e.g., controlling pollution in certain areas). This involves the
collaboration of a wide variety of CSs, as well as cooperation
with external entities such as TMSs operated by third parties
in adjacent regions. The CSs within the SoS include:
• Systems of traffic monitors – varied devices for monitor-
ing current traffic
• Systems of actuators – devices that can influence traffic
via signs and signals
• A set of regional Traffic Control Centres (TCCs) that
analyse region-wide data from monitors, select traffic
management strategies and issue appropriate instructions
to actuators
• The Traffic Information Centre (TIC), that collects nation-
wide traffic data, and makes it available to nationwide
service providers. The TIC occasionally implements a
national traffic management strategy
We present here a model that considers a subset of TMS
functionality, focusing especially on ramp metering function-
ality that is delivered by the TMS.
A ramp meter system (RMS) is situated on the access
ramp used to access inter-urban highways. The RMS employs
two-phase (red and green) traffic lights to control the rate at
which vehicles join the highway. Figure 1 presents an informal
representation of an RMS. The RMS prevents bottlenecks from
being formed when many vehicles join a major road, improves
vehicle distribution by breaking up ‘platoons’, and can reduce
accidents caused by high speed merges. An RMS typically has
access to data about traffic in its own immediate vicinity (this
differs to the regional control centre (TCC) which has access to
region-wide traffic data). The RMS operates in one of several
modes:
• Fixed-time mode, with fixed-length red/green phrases
• Adaptive mode, which responds to current traffic condi-
tions, and can be further divided into:
◦ Responsive mode, where the RMS makes ramp-
metering decisions using local data only.
◦ Collaborative mode, where the TCC makes ramp-
metering decisions using regional data, overriding the
local RMS decisions.
The collaborative mode is selected by the regional TCC
if it detects that a regionally-implemented RMS strategy is
needed. Collaborative mode is selected occasionally and is not
the default behaviour for most RMSs.
Fig. 1. Informal layout of a single ramp meter
A. Nominal behaviour
In this section, we present a SysML model of the TMS
nominal (non-faulty) behaviour. We concentrate on RMS func-
tionality specifically, omitting models of other TMS functions
(of which there are many). We have therefore simplified the
SoS to include:
• a regional TCC
• a distributed collection of data monitors employed by
the TCC. We abstract away the implementation details
of traffic monitors; this function may be implemented by
a variety of different devices, and by more than one CS
• three CSs that influence traffic behaviour:
◦ a distributed system of RMSs
◦ a separate distributed system of configurable speed
limit panels
◦ a distributed system of dynamic route information
panels
We have modelled the TCC as cycling alternately through
two phases: a phase of data gathering and analysis, followed
by a phase of implementing strategies based on the analysis.
Figure 2 presents a SysML activity diagram depicting the
initial data gathering phase. In this phase, the regional TCC
requests data from the traffic monitoring system(s). The TCC
has access to (in this case) three actuator CSs that can
help to influence traffic behaviour: a system of RMSs; a
system of configurable speed limits; and a system of dynamic
information panels. We assume that each of these actuator
systems maintains information about its current state (e.g.,
current availability, existence of faults etc.) We represent this
information in Figure 2 using one data store for each CS to
hold the configuration data. After receiving traffic reports from
the traffic monitoring CSs, the TCC collects details about the
current configuration of each of the actuator CSs from the
data stores. It then makes decisions about appropriate traffic
management strategies, and writes the details of the selected
strategies back into the relevant data stores.
Next the TCC moves to the subsequent phase of operation,
which is to implement the selected strategies to regulate traffic
behaviour (shown in Figure 3), by delivering instructions to
each of the relevant CSs on the desired behaviour, before
returning to the data gathering phase. Figure 3 depicts the
TCC forwarding instructions to the dynamic route information
system and the configurable speed limit system; however the
Fig. 2. SysML activity diagram showing TMS data gathering functionality
RMS has a more complex process, where it may be gathering
local data and making decisions in isolation, or receiving
instructions from the TCC instead. The RMS regularly collects
and analyses data about the local area and, when necessary,
selects a responsive mode of operation, in which it responds
to local conditions instead of adopting fixed durations for the
red/green phases of the traffic lights. This allows finer control
over the rate at which vehicles join the TMS. Data gathering
and analysis continues throughout this process and the RMS
will revert to the simpler fixed time mode if appropriate.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the RMS: Figure 4 shows a high
level perspective of the RMS, which is capable of operating
in an isolated mode or a collaborative mode; and details of
the RMS’s isolated mode (which may be either fixed-time, or
responsive) are shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 3. SysML activity diagram showing TMS attempts to regulate traffic
flow
At any stage an instruction from the TCC may be received,
requesting that the RMS move into collaborative mode (shown
on Figure 4 as a signal received by the RMS, and the
interrupted RMS processes contained in a SysML interruptible
region). In this case, the RMS has a simpler process, as it
should now admit vehicles on a schedule decided by the TCC
and does not need to study local conditions or determine the
Fig. 4. SysML activity diagram showing the RMS behaviour
Fig. 5. SysML activity diagram showing the RMS operating in isolated mode
(a subactivity)
appropriate mode. On receiving a signal to end collaborative
mode, the RMS resumes the analysis of local conditions.
B. FMAF views of the TMS
In this section we present viewpoints defined in the FMAF
to describe the RMS functions in terms of fault tolerance.
We implement our FMAF views in SysML, making use of a
stereotyping profile created as part of the COMPASS project,
to define FMAF entities and their properties.
1) Redundancy in the TMS: Figure 6 depicts a Fault
Tolerant Structure View (FTSV) of the TMS. In this view
we show the possible redundancy that is available within
the TMS, by identifying which CSs may be able to provide
similar services. For example, the Variable speed limit and
Dynamic route info systems provide some redundancy for
the RMS. We identify this with the providesRedundancyFor
relationship. However, we provide some qualification for this
relationship; the three systems all influence traffic behaviour
to some degree, but they do not have identical effects. If the
RMS is unavailable, then the TCC may be able to reduce the
resulting negative impact on traffic flow to a limited extent by
altering the speed limit to compensate, but the overall net effect
on traffic flow, and the potential side-effects of each system,
are not exactly the same. We represent this by adding an
extra property (a tag in SysML) to the providesRedundancyFor
dependency relationship to specify whether this is a total or
partial redundancy. In this case, we suggest that the Variable
speed limit and Dynamic route info systems can only provide
a partial redundancy for the RMS.
2) Failures of the TMS: In Figure 7 we present an initial
Fault/Error/Failure View of the case study, which allows us to
Fig. 6. Fault Tolerant Structure View of the TMS
state the failures of CSs (these are faults at the SoS level), the
SoS error states, and the SoS-level failures in which we are
interested. The TMS has a number of high-level requirements
and goals, but the one towards which the RMS contributes is
a requirement for the TMS to deliver ‘optimal’ traffic flow for
the given conditions2. Whilst this is not necessarily a safety-
critical goal for the TMS, it does have substantial impact on,
for example, regional or national economic performance (by
reducing the time and costs of transporting goods and people),
as well as reducing pollution levels and fuel burned.
Fig. 7. Fault/Error/Failure view, showing faults, errors, and failures relevant
to the RMS
The TMS does not rely on one single CS to achieve
this goal, but instead a set of CSs are incorporated into the
TMS, each of which is known to contribute towards the
overall SoS goal in some small way. For example, installation
of a correctly-functioning collection of RMSs may improve
traffic flow by some small percentage, and carefully-deployed
dynamic route information or temporary speed limits may also
achieve small improvements in traffic flow as well. When all
of these CSs operate effectively, then the ‘optimal’ traffic flow
can be achieved. If an individual CS fails (e.g., the system of
RMSs suffers some failure), then the SoS does not experience
a total service failure, but its ability to deliver optimal traffic
flow is degraded in a small way. We therefore define one major
SoS failure towards which the RMS may contribute as SoS
fails to achieve optimal traffic flow for given conditions in
Figure 7. This failure can be delivered on a sliding scale of
2We do not attempt to define ‘optimal’ traffic flow here (a major piece of
work in its own right), but assume that the TMS has a notion of what is
optimal at any one time, taking into account some predefined key priorities
and goals.
severity; if one RMS fails to operate, we expect to see a small
degradation in the SoS service, and if two or three RMSs fail
then we expect to see a more significant degradation in SoS
service. Multiple faults in the SoS can compound the severity
of the failure.
Another SoS-level failure that is relevant for the RMS,
identified in Figure 7, is Vehicles cannot join TMS. The TMS
has a requirement that vehicles should be able to join the
SoS if they want to. Ramp meters operate at the geographical
boundaries of the SoS, controlling vehicle access. If a ramp is
blocked (e.g., by a broken-down vehicle, or because it is stuck
on the red phase) then we see this failure at the SoS-level
because vehicles are prevented from joining the system.
Different faults within the RMS may result in either of
these SoS-level failures arising. The two failures are closely
related and affect each other; for example, preventing vehicles
from accessing the TMS is one (suboptimal) strategy that could
help to ensure that traffic flow within the SoS is smooth and
‘optimal’ for vehicles already in the system. On the other
hand, if traffic flow within the SoS is not optimal and traffic
jams arise, then the ramps will become blocked with vehicles
waiting to enter. Because these failures are not independent,
there’s a possibility that recovery strategies adopted by the
TMS to recover from one failure may inadvertently create
conditions to lead to the other failure arising. For this reason,
we assign each failure a priority, to allow an engineer to
consider a variety of recovery processes and strategies, and,
where multiple strategies are available, select the one with
the ‘optimal’ effect. We implement this by adding an extra
property (SysML ‘tag’) to the ‘Failure’ entity to capture this.
3) Faults of the TMS: Alongside the two SoS-level failures,
Figure 7 presents the erroneous SoS states that may lead to
the failures, and the faults3 that could cause those errors. The
SoS-level faults that could arise within the RMS include:
1) Lights stuck on green, or no lights at all
2) RMS fails to adopt collaborative mode when instructed
3) Lights stuck on red
4) RMS fails to exit collaborative mode when instructed
5) The RMS calculates an incorrect rate for vehicles to be
admitted
There are also some faults which are caused by problems
with the RMS environment, and not actual failures of the RMS
itself. These are:
6) Access ramp blocked
7) RMS is uncontactable (e.g., due to a power failure or
persistent communications problem)
These two faults result in similar SoS erroneous states as
Faults 1-5 caused by the RMS: an access ramp that is blocked
(e.g., by a broken-down vehicle or some debris) will have
a similar result to Fault 3 (lights stuck on red); whilst an
uncontactable RMS will not be entering (Fault 2) or exiting
(Fault 4) collaborative mode when instructed. Although Faults
6 and 7 are not RMS failures in themselves, we do want
to make sure that the SoS can recover from environmental
problems and so we may want to model the detection of these
3As mentioned earlier, faults at the SoS level are considered to be failures
of the constituent systems
problems and their recovery processes. There are other SoS-
level faults introduced by other CSs which may affect the
TMS’s delivery of RMS functionality (e.g., a problem with
the TCC, causing it to wrongly select/deselect collaborative
mode), but due to space limitations we concentrate here on
faults introduced by the RMS CS only.
4) Example Fault-Error-Failure chain in the TMS: Taking
two example faults of the TMS, as identified in Figure 7, an
RMS stuck on red (Fault 3) and access ramp blocked (Fault 6),
these lead to different errors of the TMS. Depending on driver
behaviour, vehicles may be admitted at a suboptimal rate (Error
1), or no vehicles are admitted (Error 2). These errors may
lead to two TMS failures; suboptimal traffic flow in the TMS
(Failure 1) and vehicles are unable to enter the TMS (Failure 2)
respectively. We can consider the priorities assigned to the two
failure events when selecting an appropriate recovery strategy.
For example, if a ramp has been blocked or stuck on red
there are likely to be vehicles waiting to join the TMS, and
potentially traffic will be backed up in the surrounding area,
as vehicles are unable to exit the surrounding local roads onto
the major highway via the ramp. Once the blockage is cleared,
there is a choice of recovery strategies:
• Adopt the usual optimal rate for admitting vehicles. This
prioritises preserving the flow of traffic on the major
highway.
• Admit vehicles more quickly than usual, to clear the
backlog of vehicles waiting on the ramp and alleviate
congestion in the surrounding area. This prioritises clear-
ing the ramp, but vehicles on the highway will have to
reduce speed to accommodate the new influx of vehicles,
and blockages on the major highway may arise.
Assigning priorities to failure events can support decision-
making when selecting the best recovery strategy. Given a full
description of the fault/error/failure propagation, in the next
section, we consider reasoning about Fault 2 in more detail
using the FMAF.
C. Analysing Fault 2
In this section, we provide a worked example of the use
of the FMAF to reason about one of the faults identified in
Figure 7. We use Fault 2 (RMS fails to adopt collaborative
mode when instructed) as an example. If the RMS fails to
switch into collaborative mode when required, and no recovery
action is taken, then the RMS will most likely be admitting
a suboptimal rate of vehicles to the TMS, because the rate of
vehicles admitted during the collaborative phase is determined
at a regional level using traffic data unavailable to the local
RMS. This will eventually lead to the failure event ‘SoS fails
to deliver optimal traffic flow for current conditions’. There
are two main causes this fault:
1) There may be a problem with the communications.
2) The RMS fails to respond correctly because of an internal
fault.
In this paper, we concentrate on the second of these for
our fault modelling; representing a failure of the RMS4. The
4Our models here do not include a notion of a ‘communications’ CS that
carries signals between CSs. However, if this is a potential source of faults
we advocate representing it as a CS in SoS models so that the impact of its
failure can be analysed (for an example of this strategy see [1]).
detection of the SoS error state will be the same, regardless
of the CS responsible for activating the fault, but the recovery
processes will differ so we need to be able to determine which
CS activated the fault. Modelling each cause of the fault allows
detection and separate recovery processes to be designed.
Figure 8 presents a Threats Chain View for Fault 2, which
illustrates how the original fault affects the SoS, beginning as
a CS-level failure (a fault within the SoS), progressing to an
SoS error state and finally the failure event. In this case we
show that the fault arises within the RMS and propagates to
become visible to an observer at the boundary of the system
as suboptimal traffic flow. The CSs involved with activating
the fault and/or detecting it are identified at each stage (the
Threats Chain View differs for Fault 2 if the fault is activated
by poor communications).
Fig. 8. Threats Chain View (Fault 2)
We next produce a Fault Activation View (FAV) for Fault
2, shown in Figure 9. This model shows the SoS-level process
for initiating collaborative mode. The instruction from the TCC
to initiate collaborative mode is received by the RMS, but the
process is interrupted by the activation of Fault 2 before the
RMS can enact the switch into the new mode. As a result of the
fault activation, the RMS continues to operate in isolated mode.
This represents an erroneous behaviour, and left unchecked
can lead to the failure event of suboptimal flow. We view the
error (of continuing in isolated mode) as a continuous state,
rather than a single event. Figure 9 represents this as two
parallel processes following fault activation: the RMS enters
a continuous isolated process, and in parallel the failure event
may arise.
Figure 9 also signals the start of the appropriate recovery
process (shown in detail in Figure 10), initiated by the TCC.
The recovery for this fault is two-pronged. The responsibility
for detection lies with the TCC, which should be able to
gather traffic data sufficient to estimate the rates at which
the individual ramps are admitting vehicles to the system, and
compare this to the expected rate. The TCC takes two actions:
a report of the problem is logged, to prompt maintenance
teams to inspect the RMS equipment for faults. To cope
with the short-term situation, the TCC updates its RMS data
store with the information that one of the RMSs is admitting
vehicles at an incorrect rate, and then returns to its cycle of
analysing data and making decisions. The data analysis and
traffic management strategies made by the TCC now take into
the account the malfunctioning RMS.
Fig. 9. Fault Activation View (Fault 2)
Fig. 10. Recovery View (Fault 2)
This recovery process represents extra small tasks under-
taken by the TCC during its data-gathering and analysis phase,
which was represented in Figure 2; we can modify Figure 2
to include this level of detail if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we use the FMAF to model fault tolerance
in an industry case study – the TMS. As most TMSs feature
constituents that have been in use for decades alongside very
recent additions, they may exhibit different features, error
detection and failure recovery strategies. The views provided
by the FMAF allow TMS engineers to plan and reason about
recovery strategies that are necessary in order to, for example,
incorporate a brand new CS into the system, by identifying
where responsibility lies for detection. The FMAF provides
a structured process for capturing and analysing where re-
sponsibilities lie within the SoS, as well as a system for
capturing rationale behind process design in a readable and
structured format. This paper presents the first use of the
FMAF for modelling degraded states in SoSs. Future work
will consider a larger industrial-scale example with multiple
interacting degraded states to evaluate the FMAF viewpoints
and their ability to model such complexities.
In using the FMAF, we motivate several extensions to the
FMAF, particularly: SoS failures modelled with a sliding scale
of degraded service; failures assigned a priority and a severity
to aid recovery planning; provision of partial redundancy for
a CS; and modelling of erroneous behaviour as a continuous
state.
There are several areas for future and ongoing work in this
area of SoS fault tolerance, including; modelling remaining
faults in the TMS case study, incorporating the newly iden-
tified extensions into the FMAF framework definition, and
the development of tools and techniques to support linking
between architectural models and fault analysis tools (such as
HiP-HOPS5) and formal verification techniques.
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